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 In mobile peer-to-peer networks many service discovery protocols have been 
proposed. Most of these protocols disregard the exposure of the participating peers’ 
privacy details, although they consider the security issues. In these methods, the 
participating peers must provide their identities, during the service discovery process, to 
be authorized to utilize the service. However, a peer might not be willing to reveal its 
identity until it identifies the service providing peer. So these peers face a problem; 
should the requesting peer or the service providing peer reveal the identity first, and 
hence, this is similar to the chicken-and-egg problem. The protocol presented in Private 
and Secure Service Discovery via Progressive and Probabilistic Exposure, solves this 
problem to some extent and works considerably to discover the services available in the 
user’s vicinity in a single-hop time sync peers only. In this paper, we propose a privacy-
preserving model based on challenge/response idea to discover the services available in 
the mobile peer-to-peer network even when the moving user and the service provider are 
at a multi-hop distance away. The performance studies shows that our protocol does this 
in a communication efficient way with reduced false positives while preserving the 





I am extremely grateful to my advisor, Dr. Sanjay Madria, for the encouragement 
and guidance he has given me and the extreme patience he has shown in my research 
work. He has also given me sufficient freedom to explore avenues of research while 
correcting my course and guiding me at all times. 
I thank Dr. Maggie Cheng and Dr. Jagannathan Sarangapani, my committee 
members, for the help and support they have provided throughout my Master’s degree 
program. I also thank Intelligent System Center (ISC) for funding the project. 
I’m grateful to Anil Jade for sharing his knowledge and providing help during my 
research. Without his help, this work and its successful completion would not have been 
possible. 
Last, but, at the top of my list, I thank my father Ramanaiah, my brothers 
Devender, Dr. Mahender and my sister-in-law, Dr. Rama Devi, for the tremendous 
encouragement and support I have received from them throughout my life which has 











TABLE OF CONTENTS 
               Page 
 
PUBLICATION THESIS OPTION ................................................................................... iii 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. v 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix 
PAPER 
PrEServD - Privacy Ensured Service Discovery in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Environment ..... 1 
 ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. 1 
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 2 
2. RELATED WORK ................................................................................................... 5 
3. MOBILE PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE ...................................... 7 
3.1. BROKER-SET FORMATION ......................................................................... 9 
3.2. BOOTSTRAPPING .......................................................................................... 9 
3.3. OVERVIEW OF THE SERVICE DISCOVERY PROCESS ......................... 11 
4. PrEServD PROTOCOL .......................................................................................... 13 
5. ALGORITHM FOR PrEServD PROTOCOL ........................................................ 16 
5.1. GENERATE KEYS PROTOCOL .................................................................. 16 
5.2. GENERATE MASKED IDENTITY PROTOCOL ........................................ 18 
5.3. COMPARE PROTOCOL ............................................................................... 20 
5.4. MASK PROTOCOL ....................................................................................... 22 
6. RESISTANCE TO REPLAY ATTACKS AND MITM ATTACKS ..................... 22 
6.1. REPLAY ATTACK ........................................................................................ 22 
6.2. MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK ............................................................... 24 
7. PrEServD PROTOCOL CONVERGES ................................................................. 25 
8. SIMULATION........................................................................................................ 27 
8.1. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON ................................................................ 28 
8.1.1. Throughput............................................................................................ 28 
8.1.2. Messages Broadcasted during Service Discovery ................................ 30 
vii 
 
8.1.3. Percentage of False-positives................................................................ 30 
8.1.4. Energy Consumption ............................................................................ 32 
8.1.5. Latency.................................................................................................. 34 
8.1.6. Restart Rate ........................................................................................... 35 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK ............................................................. 36  
10. REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 37     




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure               Page 
 
1. System Architecture ........................................................................................................ 8 
2. Bootstrapping Phase ..................................................................................................... 10 
3. Sequence Diagram for the Authorization Process ........................................................ 15 
4. Generate Keys Algorithm ............................................................................................. 17 
5. Generate Masked Identity Algorithm ........................................................................... 19 
6. Compare Algorithm ...................................................................................................... 21 
7. Mask Algorithm ............................................................................................................ 23 
8. Throughput for PrEServD and Progressive Approach ................................................. 29 
9. Message Transfers in PrEServD and Progressive Approach ........................................ 31 
10. False-Positives in PrEServD Protocol and Progressive Approach ............................. 31 
11. Energy Consumption for PrEServD (single-hop, multi-hop) and Progressive 
Approach ..................................................................................................................... 33 
12. Latency for PrEServD Protocol and Progressive Approach ....................................... 34 





LIST OF TABLES 
Table               Page 
 
8.1. Simulation Parameters ............................................................................................... 27 
  
 
PrEServD - Privacy Ensured Service Discovery in Mobile Peer-to-Peer 
Environment  
Santhosh Muthyapu and Sanjay Madria 
Department of Computer Science, Missouri University of Science and Technology, 
Rolla, MO 65409 
Email: {smv6b@mst.edu} {madrias@mst.edu} 
ABSTRACT 
In mobile peer-to-peer networks many service discovery protocols have been 
proposed. Most of these protocols disregard the exposure of the participating peers’ 
privacy details, although they consider the security issues. In these methods, the 
participating peers must provide their identities, during the service discovery process, to 
be authorized to utilize the service. However, a peer might not be willing to reveal its 
identity until it identifies the service providing peer. So these peers face a problem; 
should the requesting peer or the service providing peer reveal the identity first, and 
hence, this is similar to the chicken-and-egg problem. The protocol presented in [12] 
solves this problem to some extent and works considerably to discover the services 
available in the user’s vicinity in a single-hop time sync peers only. In this paper, we 
propose a privacy-preserving model based on challenged/response idea to discover the 
services available in the mobile peer-to-peer network even when the moving user and the 
service provider are at a multi-hop distance away. The performance studies shows that 
our protocol does this in a communication efficient way with reduced false positives 







A Mobile Peer-to-Peer Network (M-P2P) is a decentralized network in which the 
mobile peers form an arbitrary network topology. The network is ad hoc because each 
peer though willing to forward the data to others can move out of the network and hence 
the determination of which peers forward data depends on the network connectivity.  
M-P2Ps are becoming increasingly popular in the present day world, though 
theoretical and practical limits to the overall capacity of the M-P2Ps have been identified. 
This is because of the self-configuring capabilities of the participating peers to form an 
arbitrary topology and provide a broad range of services. M-P2Ps are widely used during 
emergency situations or military conflicts, because they can be deployed quickly and 
requires minimal configuration.  
M-P2P provides various services based on the type of mobile peers and the 
number of peers present. Any peer in the network can either provide a service or utilize 
the service or does both. The number of services available in the network increases with 
the increase in the number of peers. Service discovery protocols will ease the process of 
manual configurations, by the user, when many services are present in the network. The 
service discovery protocols compel the participating peers to expose their private details 
like identity. However, the participants might not be willing to reveal their private details 
during this process. Even though both the (user and service provider) peers are legitimate, 
neither of them wants to reveal their details before the other does, thus can cause a 
deadlock situation, similar to a chicken-and-egg problem.  
To analyze the problem, consider a service discovery process in M-P2P network, 
formed by several peers present in a shopping mall. Assume that a patient and a doctor 
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are present in this network and a patient tries to discover a doctor. The patient, while 
trying to discover the doctor present in the network, might not be willing to broadcast 
his/her identity and health problems in the service request. The patient would like to 
authenticate the doctor before revealing his private details. In other words, the patient 
will share his/her identity and health problems (private details) only when he/she finds a 
legitimate doctor. At the same time, the doctor is not willing to share his/her presence and 
identity (private details) in the shopping mall. The doctor wants to respond only to 
genuine clients/patients and not to the intruders. In other words, the doctor responds only 
to the patients who are authenticated and authorized at his end. In this scenario, both the 
patient and the doctor are not willing to share their details until they can authenticate and 
authorize the other. In our protocol, these peers (the patient and the doctor) play a game 
to authorize themselves without sharing the actual information (identities). Note that 
privacy preserving techniques can also be used to authenticate moving UAVs (Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle) where due to security restrictions and communication timeout, secret 
keys were not shared and instead, some privacy-preserving techniques with stored states 
can be used to establish the authorization. 
Protocol presented in [12] works considerably well to discover the services 
available in the user’s vicinity. In this approach, users and service providers exchange 
partial identities and service information in each round of message transfer. During each 
round of message transfers, both the user and service provider verify the partial 
information provided by the other. This is done until either a mismatch occurs or 
legitimacy reaches a high probability. Identities of the user and service provider are 
exchanged in the form of a code word, which is generated by a secret shared between the 
4 
 
user and service provider. The parts of the code word are exchanged in each round of 
message transfer. To generate this code word, both the peers must have synchronized 
clocks. Also, the service requests and service information are encrypted before being 
exchanged among these two peers.  
Though the protocol in [12] solves the chicken-and-egg problem to some extent, it 
has some limitations. A user can gain knowledge about the services available at the 
service provider’s end causing the privacy breach. Since, partial information is 
exchanged among the user and service provider, service provider responds with different 
codes when more than one service matches the user’s request. This protocol works 
considerably well only when service provider is in the user’s vicinity. The protocol has 
high false-positives overhead in the initial stage. Though the process converges, it takes 
large number of message transfers to converge. For example, when a user’s request 
reaches 500 service providers, it causes an average of 307 replies from these service 
providers. Most of these replies are due to false-positives occurred at the service 
provider’s end, which is because of less number of bits being exchanged in each message 
transfer. Note that in case of moving UAVs, the time is very restricted to authorize other 
UAVs in the vicinity and therefore, we need a technique which has very low false 
positives and is faster.  
In this paper, we propose a protocol to solve the chicken-and-egg problem among 
the peers participating in the service discovery protocol. The participating peers can be in 
the vicinity of one another or can be at a multi-hop distance. When the peers are at a 
multi-hop distance, a broker-based architecture will help each peer by multicasting the 
request to the highly ranked peers in the network. Then each participating peer plays a 
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game with the peer, in order to authenticate and authorize themselves, before revealing 
their private details. The game consists of various message transfers between the user and 
service provider and their validation. Each message consists of encrypted masked 
information about user/service provider identity and the service request. The game ends 
either when a mismatch occurs or when the user has been authorized at the service 
provider’s end. Even when a mismatch occur, since all the messages are masked and 
encrypted, privacy details of the participating nodes have not been revealed. Our 
simulation results show that our approach has high throughput, and requires fewer 
number of messages than the Progressive and Probabilistic Exposure approach [12].  
Since the complete identities are being exchanged, the probability of false-positives is 
less. Our broker architecture also helps in finding the reliable peers who possibly could 
provide the service.  
Rest of the paper covers Related Work in Section 2, System Architecture in 
Section 3, then detail explanation of the protocol and algorithms in Section 4 and 5 
respectively. Section 6 explains about the protocols resistance from replay attacks and 
MITM attacks while Section 7 proves the convergence of the protocol. The performance 
evaluation is given in Section 8 and the paper concludes in Section 9. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
Many service discovery protocols have been proposed. In the insecure networks 
[9], service provider will advertise all the services it has, while the users’ multi-cast their 
request to discover the services. In traditional service discovery protocols [5, 13], user 
will provide his credentials along with the service provider’s address to avail the service. 
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In these protocols, the service provider needs to publish/reveal their identities like IP 
addresses and the user reveal his credentials to authenticate itself at the service provider’s 
end.  
In service discovery service protocol [3], service providers will register all the 
services with a centralized server. A user can discover the service, by simply querying the 
centralized server. However, this protocol depends on a third party (server), and also the 
service provider’s service information and user’s service request are revealed during the 
process. The Prudent Exposure [11] ensures that only legitimate parties gain the sensitive 
information, but peers will authenticate and query all the service providers they have 
credentials with during the process. Hence, a peer has to reveal the service request to all 
of its service providers which might not be accepted. 
In Progressive and Probabilistic [12] approach, users and service providers 
exchange partial identities and service information in each round of message transfer 
until a mismatch occurs or legitimacy reaches a high probability. As discussed in the 
Introduction, though this approach solves the chicken-and-egg problem between the user 
and service provider, it has some limitations.  
Our work of ranking the nodes in the network based on the type and number of 
services a node provides was inspired from the protocols defined in [10, 4]. [10] presents 
PeerTrust – a reputation-based trust supporting framework, which include a coherent 
adaptive trust model for quantifying and comparing the trustworthiness of peers based on 
a transaction-based feedback system and a decentralized implementation of such model 
over a structured peer-to-peer network. In [4], nodes (servants) can keep track, and share 
with others, information about the reputation of their peers. Reputation sharing is based 
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on a distributed polling algorithm by which resource requestors (peers) can access the 
reliability of perspective providers before initiating the download from the M-P2P 
network.  
 
3. MOBILE PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
In this section, we will define the key terms used and discuss about the Broker-
Architecture, Broker-set formation, Bootstrapping phase and the system model.  
a) Service Provider: A peer that provides a service. 
b) User: A peer which initializes the service discovery process and tries to utilize the 
service. 
c) Broker: A peer that acts as the cluster-head and forwards the service-request queries 
to the peers present in other clusters. 
d) Intermediate peers: Peers those are present in between the User and the Service 
Provider while discovering and utilizing the services. 
In an M-P2P network, due to the arbitrary topology and lack of centralized 
system, it will be difficult to maintain the details of all the nodes at a particular location. 
In order to maintain the service details of all the peers and to utilize the network features 
(services) efficiently, we divide the network into a group of clusters. Each cluster is a 
collection of peers. All the peers in a cluster can communicate among themselves. Every 
cluster will have a special peer node called Broker which acts as the cluster-head. 
Cluster-head is selected, based on the reliability and the transmission features among the 
peers in the cluster.  The Broker will have the complete knowledge of the cluster. It 
periodically pings all the peers in the cluster and thereby maintains the information of the 
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peers which are moving in and out of the cluster. Broker will calculate the ranking 
information of each peer present in the cluster. It increases the rank of a peer whenever 
the peer provides a service successfully.  
This kind of architecture, known as Broker-Architecture, was introduced in [8], in 
which among a group of brokers present in the network, the one with lowest broker_id is 
selected as the Master Broker. A slight variation of the Broker-Architecture defined in [8] 
is being used in this paper. In our model, a Broker is selected based on the peers’ 
reliability and the transmission features. 
Broker-Architecture (shown in Figure 1) provides some advantages like -  
a) Scalability: As the network grows, information about newly joined peers is 
maintained only at the brokers. This will help to manage the peers’ information 
efficiently and incorporates the load balancing in the network.  
b) Reduces Network Traffic: Broker will multi-cast all the service requests received, to 
















c) Improves Latency: The response time for discovering a service in the network reduces 
because every service request is passed through the Broker and the Broker has some 
knowledge about the services available in the network. 
We assume that all the wireless links are bi-directional and peers can 
communicate omni-directional. A transmission link exists among the two peers if and 
only if the peers lie in the transmission range of each other. All the intermediate peers 
forward the packets selflessly. 
3.1 BROKER-SET FORMATION 
Initially all the peers in the network are non-brokers. In the process of selecting a 
peer as the cluster-head, every peer in the cluster will participate in the message transfers. 
During this process, average ratio of dropped packets to sent packets at each peer (drop-
to-send ratio) is calculated. The peer with the least drop-to-send ratio is considered to be 
more reliable and will be selected as the Broker in that cluster. 
  Once the broker is selected in the cluster, it will be used as the gateway for all the 
requests of the peers present in that cluster. A service request is sent to the broker, if and 
only if the peer cannot find the service provider in its vicinity. If the broker moves out of 
the cluster, all the peers present in the cluster will again participate in the Broker 
selection process.  
3.2 BOOTSTRAPPING 
Figure 2 shows the bootstrapping phase of the protocol, in which, a centralized 
system is used for registering and querying the services. Service providing peers register 
periodically their services with the centralized system and users (peers) subscribe for 
these services by providing their identities. A service provider provides its identity 
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(ServiceProviderID as SPID) while registering its service.  For each service subscribed 
by the service provider, it will receive the following tuple. 
{ServiceID, SPAliasID, SharedKey, UserID_List} 
In the above tuple, ServiceID (SID) represents the identity of the service and 
SPAliasID (SPAID) represents the identity used by the service provider while providing 
this service. All the peers that provide a particular service will share SPAliasID. The 
advantage of this is that a user (peer) by knowing this unique SPAliasID can discover all 
the service providers, providing that service, present in the Mobile P2P network. Another 
advantage of using SPAliasID is, even when a user discovers a service, it will not have 
the knowledge of the service provider’s actual identity. 
 
Figure 2: Bootstrapping Phase 
 
A service provider will use the SharedKey (Private Key as SSK) to decrypt the 
messages received from the users. The service providers will get a list of UserID’s which 
helps the service provider to authenticate the users in the service discovery process. 
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Users subscribe for the services, with this centralized system, by providing their 
identity (UserID as UID). On subscription, a user will receive the following tuple. 
{ServiceID, SPAliasID, PublicKey}  
User encrypts the service request using the PublicKey
 
(SPK) and tries to discover 
the service with ServiceID in the network at a service provider with SPAliasID. User and 
the service provider use the information gained in the subscription phase during the 
service discovery process. A peer (User or Service Provider) will be identified with a 
different identity (ID) at different situations, based on the type of service it is providing 
or utilizing.  
3.3 OVERVIEW OF THE SERVICE DISCOVERY PROCESS   
The ranking information of the peers is present at its broker. Initially all the peers 
will have the same rank (say zero). The rank of a peer is increased, at its broker, when it 
successfully serves a request. The model works on the assumption that, a peer with higher 
rank (successfully served many requests) will have the higher probability to serve the 
current request.  
A user initiates the service discovery process by broadcasting an encrypted 
service request. All the peers who receive this request will try to decrypt the message, 
using all the SharedKey’s they have. If none of them succeeds in doing so, the user will 
send the request to its broker. When a service request is arrived at the broker, it sends the 
request to all the peers in the same cluster. If there is no reply from the peers, then broker 
sends the request to the highest ranked peer set. If the service is not yet found, then 
broker resends the request to the next highest ranking peer set. This process is done until 
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the service is found. Brokers will send the request to the highest ranking nodes by finding 
the routes (between user and the service provider) using the DSR [6] protocol.  
Instead of flooding the service request, multicasting is being used in the above 
process which reduces the network traffic. By multicasting the request to the highly 
ranked peers, Brokers increase the probability of finding the requested service. When a 
peer (service provider) is able to decrypt the service request, it starts playing a game 
(discussed in next Section) with the user by sending a reply to the service request. Both 
the user and the service provider will play the game to authorize the other. The game will 
be continued until both of them are authorized or when at least one of them recognizes 
that the other node cannot be authorized. 
Once the service is discovered, the rank of the node providing the service will be 
increased at its broker and this information is shared among the other brokers. Also, all 
the brokers present in the route will cache the route information, which will help in the 
future service discovery process. 
Peers in the mobile ad hoc network move randomly causing the wireless 
connections, between the intermediate peers (peers present on the route between user and 
the service provider), to be disconnected. So there is a probability of route failure 
between the user and the service provider, during the authentication process (i.e., while 
the peers exchange the masked identities). When a route failure occurs, the Broker peer 
of the user will find a new route between the user and the service provider, using the DSR 
[6] protocol. The Broker, which holds the current masked identities (generation and usage 
of masked identities is discussed in Section 4) being used in the game, will resend the last 
packet, sent between the user and service provider. By doing so, the peers can still 
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continue the game and this keeps the route failure transparent to the user and the service 
provider. 
 
4. PrEServD PROTOCOL 
In the bootstrapping phase, the centralized system runs the algorithm 
GENERATE_KEYS (discussed in the Section 5.1) to generate the tuple shown in the 
previous section. After the bootstrapping phase, a peer in the M-P2P network will send a 
service-request packet to discover the service, it subscribed for. The service request will 
be encrypted with the PublicKey (SPK) obtained from the centralized system. Service 
request packet will be generated using the GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY (this 
algorithm generates the initial masked identities and is discussed in Section 5.2) and will 
be of the form, ,	
, where UPK is the User’s Public Key, m1 is the masked 
ServiceID and m2 is the masked UserID.  
m1 = GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY (SID) 
m2 = GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY (UID) 
When a peer receives a service request it will try to decrypt the message with all 
the available SharedKey’s. If a service providing peer can decrypt the message 
successfully, then it can identify the service for which the request has been received. This 
is possible because the tuple, received from the centralized system, has a SharedKey that 
is paired with a unique service. Once the message is decrypted, the service provider will 
have  
′    
′    
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Now the service provider will use the COMPARE method to compare ′  with its 
service (the service which is paired with the SharedKey used for decrypting the message) 
and to compare ′  with the list of UserID’s. Results from both the comparisons 
(′  ′  are sent along with newly masked ServiceID (n1) and SPAID (n2).  
n1 = GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY (SID) 
n2 = GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY (SPAID) 
Masking is done using the MASK algorithm, which is discussed later. The packet 
is encrypted using the User’s Public key (UPK) obtained from the service request packet. 
The reply message will look like: 
′ , ′ , , 	 
The service provider will compare ′  with the list of UserID’s (paired with the 
service) and a reply message is sent for each comparison. So, for the initial service 
request, a service provider will send multiple replies. 
At the user end, the received message will be decrypted with the User’s Private 
Key. The user will then validate the first two parts of the message ′ , ′  by 
equating them with its expected values. If there is any mismatch the user will ignore the 
received packet. Only if all the values match then the user will compare ′  with the 
requested ServiceID and ′  with the Service Provider’s ID (SPAID) using the COMPARE  
method, where  
′    ′   .  
User will send the results of the compare method (′  and 
′ ) along with the newly generated masked identities m3, m4 (using the MASK 
algorithm, discussed in Section 5.4). The packet will be encrypted as 
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′ , ′ ,, 	
 
where m3 = Mask (SID, m1, 2) and  m4 = Mask (UID, m2, 2)  
where SID, UID are the actual identities of the Service and User respectively; m1, m2 are 
the masked identities used in the service request (acts as the current masked identity) for 
Service and User respectively and the third parameter “2” represents the number of 
iterations i.e., the number of packets exchanged between these two peers.  
In this way the user and service provider exchange messages until each one is 
authorized by the other or when the reply messages does not have the expected values. 
















COMPARE method: R(x) = (WP, CP) 
WP – no: of correct letters in wrong position                          
CP – no: of correct letters in correct position. 
UPK – User Public Key 
USK – User Private Key 
GMI – GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY 
m1 = {GMI(SID)} 
 
m2 = {GMI(UID)} 
[UPK, m1, m2]SPK m1’ = SSK(m1)      
m2’ = SSK(m2) 
n1 = {GMI(SID)} 
n2 = {GMI(SPAID)} 
 [R(m1’), R(m2’), n1, n2]UPK n1’ = USK(n1)        
n2’ = USK(n2) 
m3 = {Mask(SID)} 





5. ALGORITHM FOR PrEServD PROTOCOL 
In this section, we will discuss algorithms used in our protocol to discover the 
services in a network. GENERATE_KEYS algorithm is run during the bootstrapping 
phase at the centralized system to generate the tuples (discussed in Section 3.2 
Bootstrapping).  
GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY is used by both the user and the service 
provider to generate the initial masked identity of the service, the user and the service 
provider. COMPARE is used to check the distance between the identity, present in the 
message received at a node, and the corresponding actual identity. If the results of the 
COMPARE algorithm are same as the expected values at a node, then MASK algorithm is 
run at that node to generate new masked identity, which is used in the further message 
transfers. 
5.1 GENERATE KEYS PROTOCOL 
This algorithm in Figure 4 is run by the centralized system for every subscription 
of a user or for every service registry by a service provider. The input for this algorithm is 
the identity of user/service provider along with the subscription or registry information. 
As discussed in the bootstrapping phase, the service provider will receive the following 
tuple as an output from the GENERATE_KEYS algorithm:  
{ServiceID, SPAliasID, SharedKey, UserID_List} 
A user subscribed for a service will receive the following tuple as an output from 
the  GENERATE_KEYS algorithm:  
{ServiceID, SPAliasID, PublicKey} 
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These tuples are used by the service provider and the user during the service 










































GENERATE_KEYS: This algorithm runs at a centralized system to subscribe users for a service or to 
register a   service provider’s service.   
Input: Node’s identity and whether the peer registers a service or subscribes for a service.  
(nodeID, type) 
Output: {ServiceID, SPAliasID, SharedKey, UserID_List} or {ServiceID, SPAliasID, PublicKey} 
 
GENERATE_KEYS (nodeID, type) 
{ 
IF (type = registry) 
{ 
 IF (newService) 
 { 
     Generate a random identity for the service (ServiceID) 
     Generate a random identity for the Service Provider (SPAID) 
     Select a random Public-Private (SharedKey) key pair  
 } 
      ELSE 
 { 
     Retrieve the ServiceID 
     Retrieve the SPAID 
     Retrieve the SharedKey 
     Retrieve the List of User’s subscribed  
 } 
} 
ELSEIF (type = subscription) 
{ 
  Retrieve the ServiceID 
  Retrieve the SPAID 





5.2 GENERATE MASKED IDENTITY PROTOCOL 
This algorithm in Figure 5 is run at the User end to generate the masked identity 
of the service and the user. These masked identities are used in the initial service request 
packet. This algorithm is also run at the service provider’s end to generate its masked 
identity which is used in the first reply of the service request.  
Example: Assuming the length of the identities (peer and service) to be 6, let’s say user 
picks two random numbers for Expected_CP and Expected_WP between 1 and 3.  
Expected_CP = Random (1, 3), Expected_WP = Random (1, 3) 
Here CP and WP stand for “number of correct letters in correct position” and 
“number of correct letters in wrong position” respectively. CP and WP can be understood 
clearly from the COMPARE method discussed in Section 5.3. Now to generate the initial 
masked identity, let’s pick the positions of the letters randomly. 
Loop ‘Expected_CP’ times 
randomPositions = Random (1, 6) 
    Loop ‘Expected_WP’ times 
     randomLetters = Random (1, 6) 
Using these values the user will generate the initial mask identity for a service. 
For example, let AICH5K be the actual id of a service, Expected_CP = 2, Expected_WP 
= 1, randomPositions = {3, 5} and randomLetters = {6}. We can observe that the degree 
of set (array) randomPositions is 2 which is equal to Expected_CP and the degree of set 






Figure 5: Generate Masked Identity Algorithm 
GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY: This algorithm runs at the user and the service provider to create the 
initial masked identities. 
Input: Identity of a User or a Service or a Service Provider to be masked. (ID) 




Expected_CP = Random (1, i) // “i” is a random number less than “n” 
Expected_WP = Random (1, i) 
 
LOOP Expected_CP times 
  randomPositions = Random (1, n) // “n” is the length of the Identity 
LOOP Expected_WP times 
 randomLetters = Random (1, n) 
 
ActualIdentity = ID 
MaskedIdentity = “” // initially empty string 
 
FOREACH position in randomPositions 
 MaskedIdentity[position] = ActualIdentity[position] 
 
FOREACH letterPosition in randomLetters 
MaskedIdentity[Random(1,n) – randomPositions] =  ActualIdentity[letterPosition] 
 
LOOP index = 0 to MaskedIdentity.Length  
 IF (MaskedIdentity[index] == “ ”) 





Glossary of terms and functions: 
1) Random (x,y) is a function that returns a random integer between ‘x’ and ‘y’. 
2) All identities are Strings and Identity[i] represents the character at ith index in the string “Identity” 
3) “randomPositions” and “randomLetters” are the Integer Arrays 
4) “Random(1,n) – randomPositions” returns an integer between 1,n and which is not present in the array 
‘randomPositions’ 




Since ActualIdentity is AICH5K, the number of correct letters in correct 
positions is 2 (Expected_CP) and their positions are 3 and 5. So MaskedIdentity is --C-5-. 
The number of correct letters in wrong positions must be 1 (Expected_WP) and 
the letter at the actual position is 6. Next pick a random number from 1 to 6 except 3 and 
5 (Random(1,n) – randomPositions) to place the letter at position 6 of the ActualIdentity. 
Say the random number is 1 and so the position 1 in MaskedIdentity must be filled with 
the letter at position 6 in ActualIdentity. Therefore, the MaskedIdentity is K-C-5-. Now 
fill the empty positions with some random alphanumeric letter to get the initial masked 
identity for the service, as KZCX54.  
Similarly the initial masked identities are generated for UserID and 
ServiceProviderID at the user and service provider respectively. The initial service 
request packet from the user will contain the masked identities of the requested service 
and the user along with the user’s public key. 
5.3 COMPARE PROTOCOL 
The COMPARE algorithm in Figure 6 basically checks the distances between the 
provided identity and available identities. For example, if the service ID (SID) of a 
particular service is “FLWRE9”. The user masks this particular ID into “LABRE0”. 
When we compare the actual ID and masked ID, we can see that “L” is present in the 
masked ID but in the wrong position where as “R and E” are present in the correct 
position and rest of the letters in the masked ID are not matching with the actual ID. So 
the user expects a 2 for CP and a 1 for WP (CP – the number of correct letters in correct 





Figure 6: Compare Algorithm 
 
At the service provider’s end, when it receives a message, after decrypting the 
packet it calculates the distances (WP and CP) for both SID and SPAID. The results are 
sent in the reply to the user. When the user gets the reply from the service provider, it 
compares the values of WP and CP in the reply packet with that of its expected values. If 
they are equal, then the communication continues until the user is authorized or a 
mismatch (of WP/CP) occurs. The user is said to be authorized when WP = 0 and CP = 6 
(assuming the length of the SID is 6). 
COMPARE: Returns the distance between the identity received in the message and the corresponding actual 
identity. 
Input: Actual identity and the received identity (ReceivedIdentity, ActualIdentity) 
Output: CP (number of correct letters in the correct position) and WP (number of correct letters in the wrong 
position) in the received identity.  
 
COMPARE (ReceivedIdentity, ActualIdentity) 
{ 
 LOOP index_RI = 1 to ReceivedIdentity.Length 
 { 
  LOOP index_AI = 1 to ActualIdentity.Length 
  { 
   IF (ReceivedIdentity [index_RI] = ActualIdentity [index_AI]) 
   { 
    IF (index_RI = = index_AI ) 
     CP++ 
    ELSE 
     WP++ 
   } 
  } 
 } 




“Identity[i]” represents the character at ith index in the string “Identity” 
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5.4 MASK PROTOCOL 
At a peer, if the values in the received packet and the values expected for CP, WP 
are same then the MASK algorithm in Figure 7 is run to generate new masked identities. 
At a peer, MASK algorithm uses the knowledge gained from the previous masked 
identities it encountered during the service discovery process as explained in the 
following example.  
In the example discussed in GENERATE_MASKED_IDENTITY, for the 
ServiceID A1CH5K, we have generated KZCX54 as the initial masked identity, which is 
sent in the service request by the peer. Now, the peer will expect the reply message with a 
(2, 1), for (Expected_CP, Expected_WP). If the reply message has the same values as 
(Expected_CP, Expected_WP) then the user will generate new masked identities (m3, m4) 
using the MASK algorithm. For example, if the user receives (2, 1) as the reply then the 
peer will jumble the positions of “C” and “5” and might also include another new letter in 
correct position, so the node will have a new masked id m3 = ACX4Y5. The MASK 
method is used by both the user and service provider to generate the new masked 
identities in every message transfer. 
 
6. RESISTANCE TO REPLAY ATTACKS AND MITM ATTACKS 
In this section, we will explain in detail how our protocol prevents the replay 
attacks [14] and man-in-the-middle attacks [16]. 
6.1 REPLAY ATTACK 
Consider peers Alice, Bob and Mallory (an intruder) present in the network. Assume 
that, Alice is subscribed for a service (say service X) at Bob and is trying to discover this  
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Figure 7: Mask Algorithm 
MASK: At a node, if the values received in the packet and the values expected for CP and WP are same then the 
MASK algorithm is run to generate new masked identities.  
Input: Actual identity, corresponding current masked identity and the number of iterations done so far. 
(ActualID, currentMaskedID, noOfIterations) 
Output: Newly masked identity. (newMaskedID) 
 
MASK ( ActualID, currentMaskedID, noOfIterations) { 
newMaskedID = “” //Initially empty string 
IF (noOfIterations < 3) { 
 LOOP index = 0 to ActualID.Length 
  newMaskedID[index] = currentMaskedID[Random(1, ActualID.Length)] 
} ELSE { 
 newLetter // represents the letter added from ActualID 
 randomNumber // represents the position of the “newLetter” 
 usedLetters [] = RetrieveCPWP(ActualID, currentMaskedID) 
  
 LOOP index = 0 to ActualID.Length 
  randomNumber = Random(1, ActualID.Length) 
  IF (ActualID[randomNumber] NOT IN usedLetters) 
  newLetter = ActualID[randomNumber] 
  BREAK 
  
 newMaskedID[randomNumber] = newLetter 
 
 FOREACH position in usedLetters 
  newMaskedID[position] = ActualID[position] 
 LOOP index = 0 to ActualID.Length 
  IF ( newMaskedID[index] == “ ” ) 




Glossary of terms and functions: 
1) “Random(x,y)” returns a random integer between ‘x’ and ‘y’ 
2) “usedLetters” is a character array that holds the characters that are common between ActualID and 
currentMaskedID. 
3) “RetrieveCPWP(ID1, ID2)” is a function that returns the common characters between ID1 and ID2. 
4) “Identity[i]” represents the character at the ith index in the string ‘Identity’. 
5) “x NOT IN Y” returns true if character ‘x’ is not present in the array ‘Y’. 
6) “Random(0-9,A-Z)” returns either an integer between 0 and 9 or an alphabet between A and Z. 
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service X. In order to discover the service X, Alice will create a request packet (which 
contains the masked identities of SID and UID) and broadcasts the same. Bob processes 
the received packet, creates a reply packet and sends it to Alice. Alice processes the 
received packet (checks for the match in (CP, WP)), creates a new reply packet and sends 
it to Bob. This continues until both the peers are authorized at one another (from the 
assumption, they will be authorized). 
  Assume that, Mallory eavesdrops the conversation between Alice and Bob and 
tries (in the future) to get authorized at Bob using the packets stored from this session. 
So, Mallory starts broadcasting the service request packet, then Bob will process it and 
sends the reply (this reply packet consists of newly generated masked identities and so 
Bob’s expected values changes). Mallory sends the next packet it stored (from the Alice-
Bob session) as a reply. But, when Bob processes this packet, there will be a mismatch 
between the values received in the packet and the values Bob expects. So, Bob will stop 
communicating with Mallory and Mallory will not be authorized for the service X.  
  From the above example, we conclude that an intruder can never be authorized if 
it tries to retransmit the packets it obtained by eavesdropping because a peer generates a 
new reply packet (with new masked identities and expected values) for every packet 
received. 
6.2 MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK  
The man-in-the-middle attack [16] is a form of active eavesdropping in which the 
attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays messages between 
them, making them believe that they are talking directly to each other over a private 
connection when in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the attacker. The attacker 
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can control the conversation if it can intercept the public-keys of the nodes participating 
in the conversation. 
In PrEServD protocol, peers will obtain the keys during the bootstrapping phase 
and these keys are used in order to authenticate one another. Also, all packets are 
encrypted and decrypted only at the User/SP (endpoints) restricting the intermediate 
nodes to intercept the packets. So, when an intruder in the network tries to eavesdrop 
during a service discovery process, it cannot intercept the packets because it cannot 
decrypt them. An intruder can only forward the received packet or it can try to retransmit 
the packet at a later point of time. But as discussed in Section 6.1, the intruder will not be 
authorized for using these services. 
 
7. PrEServD PROTOCOL CONVERGES  
 In this section, we discuss the transfer of messages among the peers and 
mathematically prove the convergence of our protocol.  
In the service discovery process, a peer (user) initiates a service request message. 
In response to this request message, a user will receive many replies from other peers in 
the network. These peers and the user play a game (by exchanging messages) in order to 
authenticate each other to utilize the service, provided each of them are authorized to do 
so. Let us consider replies from only one peer (say service provider) in order to keep the 
convergence proof simple.  
In response to the service request message from the user, a service provider might 
reply with multiple messages (say n1) and the user receives these n1 messages. The user 
processes the received messages and responds to the messages that have the expected CP 
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and WP values. Suppose the user replies back with n2 (n2 ≤ n1) messages in response to 
the received messages, then the service provider will process these received n2 messages 
and responds back to the messages that have the expected CP and WP values. If the 
service provider replies with n3 messages (again n3 ≤ n2) and say it receives n4 messages 
so on and so forth until both the service provider and the user are authenticated. When the 
user is authenticated at the service provider, they stop playing the game and the number 
of messages being transferred among these peers will become zero. Also, whenever the 
values of the CP and WP are not same as that of the expected, the peers stop 
communicating for that particular reply. 
Formally, if ni represents the number of messages exchanged in ith iteration and nj 
represents the number of messages in jth iteration between the two peers, then  
         ! 
where i, j " N (N is the set of Natural Numbers)  
 If f(x) is a function, which represents the number of replies a peer sends, it is 
clear from the above argument that f(x) is a monotonically decreasing function and is 
non-negative. So, we can state that 
#$
#$%  & 1  i.e., 
#$
#$%  ( 
where ‘k’ is a constant such that 0   ( &  1. Hence, we have  *+  ( *+ , 1 . 
By using the Integral Test for Convergence [15], “A non-negative monotonic 
decreasing function f defined on an unbounded interval [Z, ∞) converges iff the integral 
on f is finite, where Z is an integer”, we can prove that f(x) converges. In our case, Z = 1 
and integral of f is 
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which can be deduced to . *++   /%/
∞
  *1 , (where 0 < k ≤ 1) which is a finite 
value. Hence, from the Integral Test for Convergence, the PrEServD protocol converges. 
 
8. SIMULATION 
We built a simulation environment to study the experiments conducted using the 
PrEServD protocol described in Section 4 and Progressive Approach [12] protocol.  
The simulation area is approximately 1000 X 600 m2 and it can afford a range of 
30 to 120 peers in the network. The maximum connection distance between any two 
peers is 100 m. List of the simulation parameters are provided in Table 8.1. 
 
Table 8.1: Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Range 
Simulation area 1000 X 600 m2 
Number of peers 30 ~ 120 
Maximum Connection distance 100 m 
 
 
The simulation environment is built with varying number of nodes in the network. 
The movement of the nodes is handled by implementing the random way point model 
(RWP) [1].  In RWP, each node moves along a zig zag line from one way point to the 
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other. The random way points are uniformly distributed over the given area and all the 
nodes tend to converge at the center. But this type of model has some common problems. 
When we take the average speed of a node, it tends to decay over a period of time and 
eventually approaches zero. RWP chooses a destination and speed for a node randomly 
and independently, and the node will keep moving at that speed until it reaches that 
destination. A common problem arises when a node moves very slowly for a given long 
destination which it reaches after a very long time, which increases simulation time. To 
overcome such a problem, we have used a slight variation of RWP in which we consider 
a new parameter, time. To overcome the average speed decay problem, we randomly 
choose speed which is uniformly distributed in the interval [1, Vmax) instead of (0, Vmax) 
used previously. This ensures that the average speed does not tend to zero. 
The formation of the node cluster (Broker architecture) is handled by 
implementing a Connected Dominating Set (CDS) [7] model.  Several algorithms for the 
CDS formation have been discussed in [2], we have used Steiner tree based CDS 
construction to define Broker nodes in the network.  
8.1 PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
Simulation is performed to evaluate the performance of the PrEServD protocol. 
We compare throughputs, latency, number of messages transferred and false-positives in 
discovering services available in Mobile P2P network using the protocol defined in [12] 
and PrEServD protocol. We also study the performance of our protocol when the states 
(information of the current masked identities) are not stored. 
8.1.1 Throughput: We define, Throughput as the ratio of the number of requests 
satisfied to the number of requests initiated in the network. Figure 8 shows the 
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comparison between the throughputs of both the protocols.  The readings are taken in a 
network with 60 nodes and each node subscribed to a maximum of 30 services from the 
available 100 services. The number of requests initiated in the network varies from 5 to 
25.  
  In both the protocols, when a user broadcasts a service request packet, all the 
neighboring nodes will process the packet independently and concurrently. So, a single 
service might be found at multiple neighbors, which might result in discovering more 
number of services than requested. Also, if the service is not available in the vicinity, 
PrEServD protocol will try to discover the service in the entire network, unlike 



































8.1.2 Messages Broadcasted during Service Discovery: We compare the number of 
messages transferred/broadcasted in each protocol during the service discovery process. 
Figure 9, shows comparison between the number of messages broadcasted in PrEServD 
protocol and Progressive Approach in a network with 60 nodes while increasing the 
number of requests from 5 to 25. 
 With increasing number of requests, the number of messages broadcasted in the 
network increases for both the protocols. But the number of messages broadcasted in the 
Progressive Approach is very high, compared to PrEServD protocol, because of the lesser 
numbers of bits being transmitted in each message resulting in a large number of false-
positives. In the next section, we discuss the percentage of false-positives and compare 
the same for both the protocols. 
8.1.3 Percentage of False-positives: In PrEServD protocol, a participating peer 
compares the Expected(CP, WP) values with the received(CP, WP) values and replies for 
a match. A match can be either a true-match or a false-positive. A match is defined as a 
true-match, when it occurs between the received(CP, WP) values (of the actual UserID or 
ServiceID) and the Expected(CP, WP) values. All other matches are considered as false-
positives.  
  As explained in Progressive Approach [12], the number of false-positives 
decreases exponentially for a single service request but the total number of messages 
broadcasted in the network is very high due to these false-positives which can be seen in 
Figure 9. Figure 10 compares the percentage of False-positives for both the protocols. We 
can observe that most of the messages broadcasted in the Progressive Approach are 
because of the False-positives (it is close to 90%). 
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Figure 9: Message Transfers in PrEServD and Progressive Approach 
 
 



























































From Figure 10, we can also see that very less number of false-positives occur in 
PrEServD protocol. The reasons are twofold. One is that the information in PrEServD 
protocol is sent with complete masked identities instead of partial identities. Two, more 
levels of comparisons are required in PrEServD protocol to identify a match which 
results in lesser number of false-positives, unlike the Progressive Approach. 
8.1.4 Energy Consumption: The energy consumed for a service discovery process is the 
cumulative energy consumed at all the participating peers. The energy consumed at a 
peer depends on factors like reception power (the number of messages it receives), 
processing power (power consumed for computations) and transmitting power (number 
of messages it transmits). So, the Energy Consumed is directly proportional to the 
number of messages being broadcasted in the network and the number of nodes 
participating. 
  The readings are taken in a network of size 60 and the energy consumed for 
discovering a service is calculated using the following equation:   
01   2 3 4 5 4 6	 4   2  3 4 5	 
where ‘n’ represents the number of messages broadcasted,  
 ‘t’ represents the energy consumed for transmitting a single message, 
 ‘r’ represents the energy consumed for receiving a message, 
 ‘p’ represents the energy consumed for processing a message. 
 ‘m’ represents the number of intermediate nodes (nodes participating in the 
discovery process other than user and service provider). 
 The first part of the equation can be explained by the following argument: The 
user and the service provider will receive process and transmit exactly half the total 
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number of messages broadcasted. The second part of the equation explains the energy 
consumed by the intermediate nodes and each intermediate node is involved in 
transmitting and receiving messages.  
  For PrEServD protocol, the readings are taken for both the regular approach and 
by restricting the discovery process to single-hop (similar to Progressive Approach). In 
the regular approach ‘m’ is greater than zero while ‘m’ becomes zero for the restricted 
approach and Progressive Approach. Figure 11 shows that the energy consumed for 
discovering the services is high for PrEServD protocol compared to that of the 
Progressive Approach. This is because more number of peers’ participate in the service 
discovery process and each peer contributes to the total energy consumed. The energy 
consumed by the PrEServD protocol (restricted to single-hop) is comparatively less due 
to the fact that lesser number of messages are transferred in the service discovery process. 
 
 
































8.1.5 Latency: We compare latency, the average-time taken (in milliseconds) for 
discovering a service, for the two protocols. Figure 12 compares the average-time taken 
by the two protocols for discovering five services while increasing the number of peers in 
the network ranging 20 to 100. Figure shows that, the latency for the PrEServD protocol 
is little high, this is because PrEServD tries to discover the service in the whole network 
(services which are multi-hop away) when the service is not available in the user’s 
vicinity whereas the other protocol only finds services within a single hope. 
  The results from Figure 12 signify that the average-time taken for discovering a 
service is less in PrEServD protocol, when restricted to a single-hop. This is because 
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8.1.6 Restart Rate: In M-P2P network, peers move randomly causing the wireless 
connections, between the intermediate peers (peers present on the route between user and 
the service provider), to disconnect. Though, we keep these disconnections transparent to 
the user and the service provider (as discussed in Section 3.3) by storing the states 
(information of the current masked identities) in PrEServD protocol, we also studied our 
protocol without storing the states. That is, we restart a service request whenever the 
wireless link between the user and the service provider disconnects during the service 
discovery process and we define, Restart Rate as the number of requests restarted over 
the total number of requests.  
  We plot a graph for the restart rate (shown in Figure 13); in a network with 60 
nodes while increasing the number of service requests from 5 to 40. We compare the 
results for various node mobility rates. Node mobility rate (X %) is defined as the 
percentage of total number of nodes moving randomly in the network at any point of 
time. 
  From the Figure 13, we observe that as the number of service requests increases 
the number of requests restarted also increases. We note that when the network has at 
least 20% of the nodes moving, an average of 11.25 requests are restarted for every 40 
requests initiated, which is about 28.12% of the total requests. By restarting these 
requests, more network resources are being utilized and the latency is also increased 
while maintaining the throughput. In order to overcome this, we store the information of 




Figure 13: Restart Rate for PrEServD Protocol while Increasing Node Mobility 
Rate 
 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
  In this paper, we proposed a protocol that ensures privacy between the peers 
participating in the service discovery process. The peers reveal their identity 
progressively (by playing a game) until they are authorized. We defined the broker 
architecture that helps in organizing the network and discovering the services that are at a 
multi-hop distance away from the user. We also discussed how the protocol prevents 
replay attacks and MITM attacks. This protocol can be applied in any scenario, where the 
two communicating parties (peers) are not willing to reveal their identities, like blind 
dating, car pooling etc.  
  Simulation results prove that the PrEServD protocol is much more efficient than 
the Progressive Approach [12]. Our algorithm provides much better throughput, and 



























10% 15% 20%Node Mobility Rate
37 
 
can discover a service which is multiple hops away. Also, our protocol converges and 
requires very less number of message transfers for the same resulting in very less number 
of false-positives.  
  In our protocol, a new user might not be authorized at a service provider though it 
is subscribed for the service. This is because the service provider might not have the 
latest/updated list of users subscribed to the service. As a future work, we will provide a 
new approach to generate tuples at the broker so that the service providers will have the 
updated list of the users’ subscribed. Also, by generating the tuples at the broker, we can 
renew the keys paired with the service. 
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